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**CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE  
AGENCY FOR ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS**

## **1. The Agency**

The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is a binational agency playing an active role in the verification of the pacific use of nuclear materials that could be used, either directly or indirectly, for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

The ABACC is the only binational safeguards organization existing in the world and the first binational organization created by Argentina and Brazil.

As a regional agency dealing with safeguards, its main goal is guaranteeing Argentina, Brazil and the international community that all the nuclear materials are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The ABACC is the first integration link between Argentina and Brazil in the nuclear field. Its existence is a clear demonstration of the political will in both countries to provide transparency to their nuclear programs by creating an environment of mutual trust allowing them to face new technological challenges, while cooperating constructively with the non-proliferation policies to which both countries adhered in the international field.

The commitment made by these two countries, aimed at ensuring the performance of the ABACC and at preserving its institutional independence and the resources for its operation, is essential in order to allow the Agency to reach the goals for which it was created.

Other relevant factors involved in the success of the ABACC and in the independence of its conclusions are its technical capacity, based on highly qualified human resources and on the use of state-of-the-art equipment, as well as the permanent coordination of activities and a fast and efficient communication with the national authorities in both countries and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The ABACC is a young institution that, in a seventeen-year period, was able to start up an effective system for the control and verification of nuclear materials. The Agency cooperates actively with several institutions, providing a significant part of the necessary safeguards equipment to nuclear facilities and sharing their use, particularly with the IAEA. In order to attain better results, the institution does also make use of technical and human resources made available by Argentina and Brazil. The ABACC does also provide specific training in the areas of its competence.

Its structure involves a Secretariat including six sectors —four of them technical, one administrative and one devoted to institutional relations— allowing to apply safeguards efficiently and effectively in both countries. The performance of the Secretariat is supervised by a Commission membered by two representatives from Argentina and

Brazil. Additionally, the Agency includes a team of inspectors who are highly-qualified professionals from nuclear institutions in Argentina and Brazil. These inspectors render their services to the ABACC only during the periods encompassed by the missions for which they are appointed. As a whole, they are around 80 Argentinean and Brazilian inspectors, in equal proportions.

In the working system adopted by the ABACC, the Brazilian inspectors verify the Argentine facilities and the Argentine inspectors verify the Brazilian installations. In this model, the inspectors' technical capacities are the basis on which a significant part of the system's reliability is grounded. Their common sense and their technical and moral values, as well as their capacity for observation, are vital contributions to the effectiveness of the ABACC.

## **2. The Creation of ABACC**

The creation of the ABACC demanded a long historical process involving the generation of trust and building up a strategic alliance between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear sector. Rather than the results of the technical work, acknowledged as of international quality, the importance of the political process that led to the creation of an international agency for the control of nuclear materials is undeniable in the sphere of the relationship between Brazil and Argentina that, in this specific case, has become an example admired in several countries in the world.

The path leading to the generation of trust was a long one and required many years of negotiations performed in stages marked by joint declarations that, little by little, promoted aperture and mutual knowledge about the nuclear activities in Argentina and Brazil.

It is worth mentioning that, because of the importance of the Brazilian-Argentine bilateral relations, the negotiations that led to the creation of the ABACC were directly and permanently in the hands of the presidents of both nations, thus demonstrating the clear political will of attaining transparency in the nuclear activities performed by both countries.

The historical process of trust generation was started in 1980 when, on May 17, the Cooperation Agreement for the Development and Application of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy was signed, by which an attempt was made to set up the necessary conditions for a reciprocal knowledge of both nuclear programs.

This agreement was the starting point of a new approach by both countries to face the restrictions that were being imposed all over the world to the access to high technology and nuclear goods and services, pointing out the recent perception of the importance of bilateral cooperation in strategic areas such as the nuclear one.

After this first step, negotiations proceeded and each one of the following stages was marked by the issue of joint declarations indicating the progress attained in the process

for the generation of trust, aperture and transparency of nuclear activities in Brazil and Argentina.

The 1985-1991 period was the one involving the most intense negotiations between both countries in the nuclear sector; during this period, several very important documents were issued concerning the Brazilian-Argentine relationship in the nuclear field.

The two first ones were the Declaration of Iguazú and the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, dated November 29 and 30, respectively. In the Declaration of Iguazú, presidents José Sarney and Raúl Alfonsín expressed their belief that nuclear science and technology played a leading role in economic and social development. In the second one, the presidents decided to create a joint work group aimed at the promotion of nuclear technological development for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Practically one year after the creation of the aforementioned work group, the presidents of both countries evaluated its activities as positive and, during a meeting held in Brasilia on December 10, 1986, they issued a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy by which the decision was made to intensify the exchange of information and consultation between both countries in the nuclear energy field.

In 1987, president José Sarney visited the facilities where Argentina was performing research work on uranium enrichment, in Pilcaniyeu. In this occasion, the Declaration of Viedma was issued, in which mention was made of the possibility of technical cooperation through the integration of the nuclear industries in both countries.

The approaching process continued in 1988, when president Raúl Alfonsín visited the Aramar Experimental Center, where a series of Brazilian nuclear activities are carried out. In this occasion, the presidents of Brazil (José Sarney) and Argentina signed the Declaration of Iperó, by which the decision was made to enhance the already existing mechanisms for political and technical cooperation. However, the most important item in the Declaration of Iperó was the transformation of the working group created beforehand into the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy.

Proceeding with the approaching process, there were two other important steps preceding the creation of the ABACC: the signature of the Communiqué of Buenos Aires and of the Declaration on a Common Nuclear Policy, on July 6 and November 28, 1990, respectively, by Presidents Fernando Collor and Carlos Menem.

In the Communiqué of Buenos Aires, the presidents highlighted the importance of the Brazilian and Argentine nuclear programs and the need to strengthen cooperation between both countries and, in the Declaration on a Common Nuclear Policy, signed in Foz de Iguazú, a definite step was taken prior to the creation of the ABACC: the approval of the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC).

In this Declaration, both countries did also decide to start negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for promoting the signature of a Joint Safeguards Agreement based on the SCCC.

Once this step was taken, finally, on June 18, 1991, Brazil and Argentina signed the Guadalajara Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (Bilateral Agreement) in which, among other actions, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created, aimed at the application and management of the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.

Once the Agency was created, on December 13, 1991, an Agreement was signed by Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA and the ABACC that would consolidate the system for application of safeguards that is currently in force in both countries.

### **3. The SCCC**

The Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) is a set of safeguards procedures applicable to all the nuclear materials used in all the nuclear activities performed within the jurisdictions or in the territories of Argentina and Brazil. It is aimed at ensuring that no significant amounts of these materials are deviated to the manufacture of weapons or other devices of mass destruction.

The SCCC was legally established under the Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Argentine Republic for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (also known as the “Bilateral Agreement”).

The main purpose in the creation of the SCCC was providing uniformity to the safeguards procedures applied in Argentina and Brazil. Thus, all the safeguards requirements and procedures became applicable to both countries and the operators of the nuclear facilities in both nations started to follow the same control regulations concerning nuclear materials and are submitted to the same type of verification and control.

#### **3.1. General procedures of the SCCC**

The General Procedures of the SCCC are consolidated in a document approved by the ABACC’s Commission and involving three parts: the first one contains the requirements for the licensing of a nuclear facility, as from the safeguards viewpoint; the second one includes the procedures for the application of the SCCC by the nuclear authority of each country and the third one refers to the procedures for the regional application of the SCCC by the ABACC.

This document sets forth the essential criteria of safeguards, including the definition of the starting point for the application of the SCCC, the procedures to be followed for delivering the information on nuclear facility projects to the ABACC, the reports on

inventories of nuclear materials and their variations in each nuclear facility, the applications for exemptions and conclusion of safeguards on nuclear materials, the purpose, intensity and scope of the inspections for the verification of nuclear materials and their variations, as well as the provisions for the application of containment and surveillance measures.

The General Procedures of the SCCC involve two additional documents that must be prepared by each nuclear facility: the Technical Questionnaire and the Application Manual. The Technical Questionnaire is a document that must be delivered by the facility operator to the ABACC, containing relevant information on the nuclear material, its use and storage. Using this information, the ABACC prepares a specific safeguards approach for that facility. The Application Manual is a document containing all the procedures for the control and verification of nuclear materials used in a given facility.

In short, the General Procedures of the SCCC are the ones establishing the grounds for the application of safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, which are fully compatible with the international safeguards adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

### **3.2. The SCCC and the control elements of the ABACC**

The ABACC is responsible for the management of the SCCC and must apply a control system allowing it to reach conclusions regardless the opinions in the countries and to detect any deviation of nuclear materials for purposes that are not authorized in the Bilateral Agreement. In order to comply with this objective, the ABACC applies criteria and procedures defining the specific features of the control of the nuclear material in a given facility. There is a series of control elements whose examination, consistency analysis and verification are aimed at allowing the Agency to obtain safeguards data; among them, the following are worth being noted:

- Accounting and operational records concerning the nuclear materials that need to be kept in each facility;
- Reports on the balance of nuclear materials that must be sent periodically to the ABACC;
- Anticipated notices on the transfer of nuclear materials that must be sent to the ABACC;
- Protection applied to the nuclear materials in the facility;
- Surveillance systems used for the nuclear materials in the facility;
- Independent conclusions obtained by means of inspections of the inventory of nuclear material and its variations.

The ABACC must receive the Technical Questionnaire before the nuclear materials reach the facility for the first time. As a general rule, the minimum term fixed is 180 days. As soon as the Technical Questionnaire is received, the ABACC analyzes the delivered data

and, further on, a new analysis of the information is performed at the facility. After completion of the verification, the Agency prepares the adequate safeguards approach, which is consolidated in the Application Manual. After this, the regime of ordinary inspections is enforced for the verification of the nuclear material inventory in that facility and its variations. The results of the evaluation of all the control and verification activities are reported periodically to the corresponding national authority in each country.

#### **4. ABACC and IAEA**

##### **4.1. Coordination of activities and their legal basis**

On December 13, 1991, an Agreement was undersigned between the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Argentine Republic, the ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards, currently known as the Quadripartite Agreement.

The Quadripartite Agreement is a legal instrument that regulates the relationship between the ABACC and the IAEA and establishes the cooperation activities that must be performed with regard to nuclear safeguards. The essential part of the agreement is the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC), already established between both countries, in which emphasis is made of the fact that both institutions must work in a way so as to avoid the unnecessary duplication of activities. This directive appears expressly in several points of the Quadripartite Agreement; among them, the following are worth being mentioned:

- The IAEA shall apply safeguards in a way so as to allow for the verification of the SCCC conclusions [art. 2c];
- The visits and activities of the IAEA inspectors shall be organized taking into account the activities of the ABACC, so as to avoid an unnecessary duplication of efforts [art. 8c(iii)];
- When performing its verification activities, the IAEA shall make full use of the SCCC and avoid the unnecessary duplication of the ABACC's control and accounting activities [art. 32].

As from such well-founded conception, many articles of the Quadripartite Agreement and of its Subsidiary Arrangements refer to issues related to the coordination between the ABACC and the IAEA and, in order to allow for the concrete and harmonic development of the cooperation between both entities, a special chapter was entered to the Subsidiary Arrangements named: "Arrangements between the ABACC and the IAEA for Cooperation in the Application of Safeguards under the Agreement".

This chapter defines important issues in connection with the coordination activities, such as the coordination meetings, the scheduling of inspections and the meetings that need to be held before and after the inspections performed by both institutions.

## **4.2. The relationship between the Agencies**

Since the enforcement of the Quadripartite Agreement, both entities have performed a great coordination effort. In 1997, as a result of such effort, a document entitled “Guidelines for the Coordination of Activities between the IAEA and the ABACC” was developed and approved; the document establishes the bases for the performance of joint activities in the areas of inspection, common usage of containment and surveillance equipment and of calibration patterns, and shared usage of portable measuring equipment. This led to the preparation of specific procedures to be used jointly by both institutions for each type of safeguards equipment. Consequently, another significant increase took place in cooperation, involving joint planning in the definition the necessary safeguards equipment for each facility and decision-making with regard to the organization that would be responsible for its installation and maintenance. A good example of this cooperation was the decision made concerning the ownership by the IAEA of the surveillance systems installed at the Angra I Nuclear Power Plant, at the Embalse Nuclear Power Plant and at the Pilot Enrichment Plant in Aramar, as well as the Fuel Counter of the Atucha I Nuclear Power Plant. On the other hand, the surveillance systems installed at the Angra II Nuclear Power Plant, at the Isotopic Enrichment Laboratory in Aramar and at the Atucha I Nuclear Power plant would be owned by the ABACC.

Another important event concerning cooperation between both entities was the approval of the document on “Arrangements for Unannounced Inspections” in enrichment facilities. This document establishes the conditions for both institutions to perform coordinated unannounced inspections in this type of facilities, either individually or jointly.

Another relevant fact in the cooperation between the ABACC and the IAEA was the development of a program allowing the inspectors from both entities to perform joint audits of a facility’s accounting records during its inspection.

The progress attained in cooperation between both organizations did also result in the preparation of the document “Guidelines for Joint Inspection Activities”. This document consolidates all the procedures agreed upon by both entities for safeguards activities in a given facility. Its main objective is related to the political will in Brazil and Argentina expressed in the Quadripartite Agreement: as far as it is possible, each activity shall be performed only once during the inspection, thus avoiding the unnecessary duplication of efforts and improving the safeguards work performed by the inspectors.

## **5. The Structure of the ABACC**

### **5.1. The Commission**

The Commission of the ABACC is the unit with maximal hierarchy within the institution. Its main task is orienting and setting the course for the activities of the Secretariat. Also, the Commission is responsible for the approval of the decisions, resolutions and



regulations applied to the performance of the ABACC. The Commission includes four members, two of them representing each one of the countries.

In addition to supervising the Secretariat, establishing guidelines for its activities and providing the means for their execution, the Commission is responsible for appointing the high-ranking staff (the so-called “Officers”), for approving the hiring of auxiliary personnel and for appointing the inspectors who carry out the safeguards tasks in Brazil and Argentina.

The Commission of the ABACC does also approve the General Procedures and the Manuals for Application of Nuclear Safeguards prepared by the Secretariat and used for the tests performed by the Agency. On the other hand, the Commission can request the creation of advisory ad-hoc teams in order to obtain information considered as necessary for the performance of its role. Before the government of both countries, the Commission of the ABACC has both the responsibility and the duty to let the parties know about any eventual abnormalities occurring within the Common System of Accounting and Control (SCCC).

## **5.2. The Secretariat**

The Secretariat includes all of the ABACC’s technical and support team. Internally, it is divided into six sectors: Planning and Evaluation, Operations, Accounting of Nuclear Materials, Technical Support, Institutional Relations and the Administrative-financial sector. Each one of the first four sectors is membered by two Officers, one from Argentina and one from Brazil. The two last sectors are in charge of two Officers, one from Brazil and one from Argentina. The Secretariat is membered by a Secretary and a Deputy Secretary, also a Brazilian and an Argentinean, who exchange their positions every year. In addition to the officials, there are around 80 inspectors and 8 other people who perform part-time activities (only during the safeguards missions), providing support to the various activities performed by the ABACC.

The Secretariat is responsible for the performance of the activities required for the application of the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) on the basis of the guidelines established by the Commission of the ABACC and for representing the Agency before the Argentine and Brazilian authorities.

## **5.3. Planning and Evaluation Sector**

Among other activities, this sector of the ABACC takes care of preparing the plans for the application of safeguards, in addition to their follow-up and evaluation at the various nuclear facilities in Brazil and Argentina, as established in the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC).

This sector evaluates the tentative scenarios of deviation of nuclear materials, the possibilities for concealment and the adequate countermeasures for each case. Also, the procedures for inspection and the implementation of safeguards approaches are studied, while the information related to nuclear facilities is analyzed and the results of the inspections performed by the ABACC are evaluated.

As a result of those tasks, a relevant volume of data arises, which is made available to the Secretariat of the Agency, related to the reality in each facility and to any possible anomalies in the application of safeguards. That is, this is where compliance with the safeguards objectives established by both countries is verified.

Another issue characterizing Planning and Evaluation is that this sector is responsible for the coordination of the technical negotiation meetings held with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with the nuclear authorities from both countries; consequently, this sector is the focus of convergence for all the discussions dealing with strategies for action in the implementation of safeguards.

#### **5.4. Operations Sector**

The Operations Sector of the ABACC is the spot in which the main activities of the organization are implemented. As the mission of ABACC is to prevent and detect the deviation of nuclear material for weapons manufacturing in Argentine and Brazil, it's necessary to perform inspections in all facilities and nuclear materials of both countries. This activity is coordinated directly by the Operations Sector.

The inspections are made in order to control the nuclear facilities and materials as from the safeguards point of view. Usually, inspections are classified into two classes: Inspections for Physical Inventory Verification and Interine Inspections. In the former, the quantity of nuclear material available in the facility at a given moment is verified. The Interine Inspections take place several times between two Physical Inventory Verifications in order to perform a more efficient follow-up of the job performed at the nuclear facilities.

Inspections differ depending on the material to be verified and the type of facility — which can be, for example, an uranium enrichment plant, a nuclear reactor or a laboratory. Additionally, inspections can be classified as “Announced”, that is planned and reported ahead of time to the facility operator, and as “Unannounced”, which are performed without prior notice to the operator and under special plans for access to the facilities. The latter feature for their surprise factor, which brings along the conditions required to discover any possible clandestine activity.

The Operations Sector is the one coordinating the safeguards inspections, along with the national authorities in each country and with the IAEA. On the other hand, this sector instructs and supports the inspectors, evaluates them and trains them in their activities. Besides, Operations manages the ABACC's database developed specifically for processing and storing the data collected in each inspection. This is the information used

by the ABACC to comply with its goal of reporting to both countries that there is no deviation of nuclear materials to any prohibited activity.

## **5.5. Accounting Sector**

In a very different manner from that usually employed, the ABACC utilizes the term “accounting” to specify the activities performed in a sector that processes and analyzes the nuclear material accounting data received from the national authorities, from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and from the audits performed during the safeguards inspections carried out in Brazil and Argentina.

This is the sector where the accounting information is verified, where a follow-up is performed and where eventual discrepancies are solved. All of this within the framework of the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) and aimed at keeping the inventories of nuclear materials to be managed by the ABACC both updated and correct. Additionally, a cross verification of the data is performed and information relevant to other sectors of the ABACC and to the IAEA on the accounting of nuclear materials is generated.

Also, the Accounting Sector creates safe procedures for the communication of accounting information from Argentina and Brazil, in addition to defining and evaluating the procedures for the auditing of records. These activities are performed by means of two softwares: one of them installed at the ABACC and another one —the Software for Joint Auditing of Records (SJAR)— used by the inspectors in the field.

By means of the software installed in the computers of the ABACC, the inventories of nuclear materials can be updated, the reports on the nuclear materials sent by Brazil and Argentina can be issued and the information sent to the IAEA can be produced, as established in the Quadripartite Agreement.

The SJAR is used during the inspections and allows to verify the data on the nuclear materials registered by the operators at the nuclear facilities, as well as to perform joint audits by technicians from the ABACC and the IAEA.

Additionally, the Accounting Sector organizes and provides training to inspectors from the ABACC and the IAEA, such as the “Training on Containment and Surveillance Systems and Fuel Verification”, the “Course on Auditing of Records”, the “Training on the Neutron Collar”, the “Training on Unannounced Inspections” and the “Training on Inspection Procedures”.

## **5.6. Technical Support Sector**

A particular feature of the Technical Support Sector is that it deals with all the equipment units used by the ABACC in the application of safeguards. It is through this sector that certain activities are ensured, such as the selection, calibration, maintenance and availability of equipment for analyses, for containment and surveillance, and for use during inspection, among other.

Basically, this sector takes care of the identification, purchase, reception and calibration of equipment units and materials, locating them at nuclear facilities in both countries on the basis of the safeguards approaches established for each one of them. Also, this sector looks after the maintenance of these equipment units, wherever they are.

Besides that, this sector coordinates and cooperates with Brazil, Argentine or other nuclear international organizations, in the development of new equipment and methodologies used solely by ABACC or in partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Other duties of the Technical Support sector are the preparation of procedures for the utilization of equipment and materials by the ABACC, for their use during inspections, and the evaluation of the inspectors from the ABACC and the IAEA.

During the inspections, samples are collected in order to verify the authenticity of the data provided by the operators of the nuclear facilities. The samples are analyzed in the laboratories of the ABACC's analytical network or in external laboratories. This activity is under the control of the Technical Support Sector.

Also, this Sector performs the evaluation of the measuring techniques used by the ABACC and of the participation of technicians in the training activities devoted to inspectors, especially in the most specific techniques, such as new surveillance systems and unannounced inspections.

## **5.7. Institutional Relations Sector**

This sector of the ABACC takes care of the social communication activities and manages the procedures maintaining the status of the ABACC as an international agency, along with the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE) and the Argentinean Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade and Worship (MREyC), looking after the administrative issues related to these duties.

As implicit in its name, the area of Institutional Relations is aimed at promoting the Agency and, also, at creating, maintaining and enhancing its relations with other organizations. When faced with this reality, the social communication work becomes both evident and necessary as soon as the tools are made available to help in the performance of these activities and offer the manager the capacity to analyze the information being spread as from different viewpoints. The ABACC is further and further taking the above into account because it is through the information being spread that the Agency establishes the type of relationship that it maintains with its public.

Information is the keyword in this sector of the ABACC. It is here where the informational contents, not necessarily technical, for the various audiences are devised, processed along with the other sectors, edited and spread. Depending on the objective, these contents are included in the annual reports, in the ABACC News (the Agency's virtual journal) or in its website, making use of a clearer and more attractive and accurate communication, oriented to the results of the Agency's activities and specifying what is being done in order to obtain such results.

Concerning the activities performed in the diplomatic field, the International Relations sector operates as a liaison between the Brazilian MRE, the Argentine MREyC and the ABACC. Thus, work is carried out aiming at guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of the organization and of its officials, helping in the dealings of the documents issued by those agencies, so that they are released, and providing information whenever it is requested. Due to its profile, this sector of the ABACC does also operate as an interface between the Agency and other institutions, such as embassies, consulates and international agencies.

Another task of this sector is the follow-up of the cooperation agreements with other institutions entered (or to be entered) by the ABACC. All of these documents are under the custody of the Institutional Relations Sector and are updated by this Sector as needed.

Summarizing, this sector concentrates a large volume of information related to the ABACC in general and operates as a spreader of the planned and well-designed contents, on the basis of the orientation from the institution's Secretariat.

## **5.8. Administrative and Financial Sector**

This is the sector performing the activities aimed at managing the financial and human resources of the ABACC, so that they are used efficiently and allow to reach the objectives and goals established annually in the Agency's Work Plan and Budget.

This sector cooperates with the Secretariat in financial planning and in the application of the funds of the institution. For this purpose, the necessary analyses are performed concerning the costs, prices and required income for the purchase of goods and services. Also, this sector takes care of the accounting records of the ABACC, performs the registration of its patrimony in capital goods and manages the accounts of the organization. Another duty of this sector is managing the hiring of services as required by the other areas of the ABACC.

With regard to human resources, this sector of the Agency is in charge of the tasks related to the personnel of the Secretariat, including the inspectors. For this purpose, the records of the professionals connected with the ABACC are kept updated, the payments are made and their medical assistance is controlled, among other duties.